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SI: Ethics as Method
Introduction
In the growing field of “critical algorithm studies” (Seaver & 
Gillespie, 2016), moral problems are pervasively raised, but 
rarely theorized. This article is an attempt to systematize how 
critical scholars consider the normativity of computational 
algorithms and propose a complementary perspective.
It begins by suggesting that this field tends to center on 
what I term the moral harm paradigm.1 According to it, the 
invisible and biased operations of algorithmic power violate 
universal values in ways that are concretely harmful to the 
autonomy of individuals and communities. From this per-
spective, the critique of the morality of algorithms is a par-
ticularly complex, but also a relatively narrow problem: it 
ultimately concerns what algorithms do to people. I then 
identify an alternative critical paradigm, which takes a defla-
tionary perspective toward power and its moral conse-
quences. This strand assumes that various “actors” of 
“algorithmic assemblages” can, to variable extents, perceive 
what algorithms do—including non-expert end users. Such 
insight grants to these users the possibility of moral agency, 
I contend. This, in turn, allows for the examination of how 
ordinary people reflect on the normative decisions made by 
algorithmic power and, based on this, consciously transform 
their ethical selves. Such end user-oriented ethics of algo-
rithms concerns not what algorithms do to people, but what 
people intentionally do to themselves (and others) in reaction 
to what they think algorithms do to them.
The second part of the article proposes one way of criti-
cally conceptualizing these processes. Building on Michel 
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Abstract
Moral critiques of computational algorithms seem divided between two paradigms. One seeks to demonstrate how an opaque 
and unruly algorithmic power violates moral values and harms users’ autonomy; the other underlines the systematicity of such 
power, deflating concerns about opacity and unruliness. While the second paradigm makes it possible to think of end users 
of algorithmic systems as moral agents, the consequences of this possibility remain unexplored. This article proposes one 
way of tackling this problem. Employing Michel Foucault’s version of virtue ethics, I examine how perceptions of Facebook’s 
normative regulation of visibility have transformed non-expert end users’ ethical selves (i.e., their character) in the current 
political crisis in Brazil. The article builds on this analysis to advance algorithmic ethical subjectivation as a concept to make sense 
of these processes of ethical becoming. I define them as plural (encompassing various types of actions and values, and resulting 
in no determinate subject), contextual (demanding not only sociomaterial but also epistemological and ethical conditions), and 
potentially harmful (eventually structuring harms that are not externally inflicted by algorithms, but by users, upon themselves 
and others, in response to how they perceive the normativity of algorithmic decisions). By researching which model(s) of 
ethical subjectivation specific algorithmic social platforms instantiate, critical scholars might be able to better understand the 
normative consequences of these platforms’ power.
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Foucault’s peculiar kind of virtue ethics, I examine the uncer-
tain ways Brazilian non-expert end users have intentionally 
adapted their political voices to what they perceived as the 
normative requirements of Facebook’s algorithms. This anal-
ysis serves as both an example of how to empirically approach 
this sort of self-formation and a theory-building exercise. 
From it, I propose algorithmic ethical subjectivation as a con-
ceptual framework to consider that specific form of ethics of 
algorithms. Before concluding, the article unpacks three gen-
eral features of this framework: plurality, contextuality, and 
potential harmfulness.
Contrasting Critiques of the Morality of 
Algorithms
Harmful Algorithms
The notion of harm pervades the moral issues invoked by 
scholars in relation to algorithms. To be sure, only some of 
the works in this moral harm paradigm explicitly theorize 
harms as moral. Concerns about morality are usually implicit 
in critical discussions on algorithmic power. While the para-
digm comports a plurality of definitions of such power, these 
definitions usually rely on a common fundamental injustice: 
one between “sorters,” “those who are able to” produce and 
analyze digital data, and “sortees,” “those who find their 
lives affected” by these analyses (Andrejevic, 2014, p. 1683). 
By materializing and reproducing this structuring condition 
of inequity, algorithmic power would violate core moral val-
ues and lead to tangible harms to sortees’ lived autonomy.
Research has demonstrated that a form of fragmented, par-
ticipatory, and hypertrophied “dataveillance” (Albrechtslund, 
2008; Clarke, 1988) incessantly violates sortees’ privacy to 
turn their behavior into readable data points (e.g., Citron & 
Gray, 2013). This “post-panoptic” monitoring hinges on pro-
prietary algorithms. They probabilistically derive ever-fluid 
data selves, based on which corporate and governmental deci-
sion are made, but over which sortees have no control 
(Cheney-Lippold, 2011, 2016; Turow, 2011; Yeung, 2016). If 
perceived, dataveillance might harm individuals’ ability to 
express themselves freely; if not, it may underpin other harm-
ful procedures (Calo, 2011). Second, undetectable algorithms 
are said to automate previous forms of digital “echo cham-
bers,” giving rise to “filter bubbles” of personalized content 
(Pariser, 2011; see though Boxell, Gentzkow, & Shapiro, 
2017; Dubois & Blank, 2018). By decreasing exposure to 
divergent views, facilitating the circulation of so-called “fake 
news” and allowing the microtargeting of voters, such viola-
tion of diversity would harm sortees’ capacity to tolerate 
others and make informed decisions (Sunstein, 2017). Third, 
“learning algorithms” can invisibly reproduce and deepen 
various forms of prejudiced social classification (Barocas, 
2014; Lauriault, 2017), manifesting a new form of “rational 
discrimination” (Gandy, 2009; McQuillan, this issue). The 
consequences of these violations of fairness are compounded 
as they tend to inform an increasing number of non-algorith-
mic decisions, harming people’s “life-chances”2 (Angwin, 
Larson, Mattu, & Kirchner, 2016).
Arguments on moral harms can be seen as premised on 
three implicit assumptions. The first is definitional. This par-
adigm assumes algorithms to be digital opaque artifacts, con-
trolled by sorters and constituted by three elements: (1) 
biased computational code which analyze (2) biased digital 
data to find patterns and invisibly make, or assist in the mak-
ing of, (3) normative decisions on behalf of sortees: what 
they ought to see, with whom they ought to interact, what 
they ought to know, and so on. As theories that identify, in 
the unknowability of power, the essence of its efficiency 
(Lukes, 1974), the opacity of algorithms is assumed as a cen-
tral constitutive component of the moral harms produced 
through any of their elements. As lack of “technical literacy,” 
“corporate or state secrecy” or a mismatch between human 
and artificial heuristics (Burrell, 2016, p. 1), opacity poses an 
unprecedented threat to the capacity of users, academics, and 
policy-makers to be aware of, study and regulate digital plat-
forms, scholars agree (cf. Pasquale, 2015).
This discussion matters because works in this paradigm 
tend to assume that the opacity of code, data, and algorithmic 
decisions entails an asymmetrical distribution of moral 
agency between sorters and sortees. If human moral agency 
is the capacity of an individual to govern her behavior 
according to moral standards (Himma, 2009, p. 21), sortees 
could only be agents if they could intentionally entertain 
moral considerations about their relationship with algo-
rithms. However, ignorant of or poorly informed about these 
artifacts, these users emerge from this paradigm mostly as 
victims. That is, as individuals who eagerly engage with their 
unknowable perpetrators without being able to consider the 
moral implications of such engagement’s algorithmic com-
ponent.3 On the other hand, due to their considerable (not 
limitless) comprehension of and control over algorithms, 
sorters appear in this paradigm to be endowed with a vast 
moral agency. Therefore, their actions toward these artifacts 
would be amenable to moral critique and accountability.
The third assumption regards which conception of moral-
ity can make sense of the relations between those particularly 
defined “artifacts” and shaped moral subjects. While authors 
rarely pick philosophical positions, this paradigm appears to 
operate between consequentialism, as suggested by the focus 
on harms, and deontology, as indicated by the recourse to 
universal moral values as a measure of good (see Sandvig, 
Hamilton, Karahalios, & Langbort, 2016). One way of mak-
ing sense of this hybrid conception is with what Bernard 
Williams (1985) called “morality system” (p. 174). 
Characterized by the centrality of general obligations, this 
third-person perspective of the moral, of which both deonto-
logical and consequentialist accounts are part, stresses the 
importance of a distinct view of blame—one that, conceived 
of as objectively founded, overlooks the contexts of moral 
actions. This paradigm frequently assumes these contexts to 
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be either mostly inexistent (sortees’) or inaccessible (sort-
ers’). This article argues that the notion of harm can be 
treated from a different conceptual perspective, founded on 
distinct assumptions about what algorithms are, the ways 
they affect moral agency, and how morality can be conceived 
of. I turn to these problems below.
The Deflationary Paradigm
An alternative paradigm within critical algorithm studies is less 
interested in denouncing moral harms than in complicating 
what algorithmic power is and how it can be tamed, taking thus 
a “deflationary” stance (Neyland, 2016; Ziewitz, 2016). Usually 
relying on ANT (Actor-Network Theory), it defines algorithms 
as assemblages of human and non-human actors engaged in 
mutually constitutive relations (Scott & Orlikowski, 2009). 
From this view, studying one actor in isolation (say, code) is in 
principle misleading because actors’ attributes are not pos-
sessed, but enacted—there is no “inside” to be objectively 
“revealed” (Ananny & Crawford, 2016). This co-constructivist 
take and expands what counts as these assemblages’ actors. 
They include not only those controlling data collection, code 
design, and algorithmic decisions but also users of platforms. 
These may be activists (Milan, 2018), search engine optimiza-
tion specialists (Ziewitz, 2012), media professionals (Gillespie, 
2017) and, of specific interest for this article, non-expert end 
users.4 There is an emerging, empirically based understanding 
that this kind of user can perceive the inclinations of behind-the-
screen content curation. Termed “folk theories” (Eslami, 
Vaccaro, Karahalios & Hamilton, 2017) or “imaginaries” 
(Bucher, 2016), such lay comprehension is depicted as inform-
ing how algorithmic power operates. Echoing earlier sociologi-
cal accounts of quantification (e.g., Espeland & Stevens, 2008), 
this paradigm argues that these perceptions explain how ordi-
nary individuals behave differently from what would be 
expected in the moral harm paradigm. They might internalize 
“theories” and “imaginaries,” self-regulating their actions to 
comply with what they think algorithms expect (Introna, 2016), 
devise strategies to game the system (boyd, 2017), and employ 
these perceptions to frame their resistance to platforms’ unilat-
eral changes (DeVito, Gergle, & Birnholtz, 2017).
It is my contention that this other definition of “algo-
rithm” enables us to challenge the extent to which non-
expert end users are devoid of moral agency. For, if these 
individuals can somehow apprehend (theorize, imagine) 
platforms’ algorithms, they can also somehow entertain 
moral standards when consciously acting in response to 
algorithmic decisions. This possibility entails a proliferation 
of empirical entry points into the normativity of algorithms. 
Data, code, and some of the most relevant sorters might still 
be inaccessible—but ordinary people’s perceptions and 
practices are some of the prototypical objects of analysis of 
qualitative researchers. They might be observed via ethno-
graphic work and explored through self-reporting methods 
(Couldry, Fotopoulou, & Dickens, 2016; Kitchin, 2016; 
Markham, 2017). The deflationary paradigm, and in particu-
lar Ananny’s (2016) insightful piece, do hint at these recon-
figurations of moral agencies—usually to discuss 
algorithmic accountability. But they neither take account of 
these other ordinary entry points nor unpack the “somehow”s 
mentioned above. The rest of this article draws on a differ-
ent conception of what has been called so far “morality” to 
propose one way of doing both.
An End User-Oriented Ethics of 
Algorithms
The investigation of this moral agency qua an element of 
algorithmic social platforms5 might be termed an ethics of 
algorithms, but oriented toward non-expert end users of plat-
forms. Bernard Williams posits that an “ethics”—as opposed 
to “morality”—enables a first-person, “ethnographic stance” 
(Williams, 1986, p. 204) toward the irreducible and multiple 
contexts shaping how individuals practically address the 
Socratic question (how should one live?) and, in so doing, 
shape their character. In relation to algorithms, this might 
mean critically investigating a basal process which has been 
so far neglected by the reviewed literature: how non-expert 
end users’ perceptions of platforms’ algorithms are related to 
the construction of their ethical selves. But, differently from 
Williams, I do not downplay concerns raised by a moral 
view. As defined here, the ethics of algorithms sits between 
the two paradigms. On one hand, it assumes that algorithms 
can only be understood relationally—and are perceivable by 
users. On the other hand, it attempts to rearticulate the prob-
lem of harms—but by nesting it within a conceptualization 
of ethics that is interested in the agency of those who, so far, 
have been mostly assumed to be passive targets of sorters’ 
actions. In this way, a “morality of algorithms” and an “eth-
ics of algorithms” are complementary, not opposing.
As it becomes clearer below, Michel Foucault’s critical 
form of virtue ethics is particularly well-positioned to tackle 
the sort of experience I am interested here. Foucauldian eth-
ics has become influential among philosophers of technol-
ogy (Dorrestijn, 2012) and anthropologists (Faubion, 2011; 
Laidlaw, 2014), but has not been openly explored by 
Foucauldian-inspired scholars of algorithmic power (e.g., 
Bucher, 2012; Introna, 2016; Reigeluth, 2014; Rieder, 2017). 
The projection of his view onto the said self-formation pro-
cess makes up what I call algorithmic ethical subjectivation.6 
Detailing it demands, first, a detour to Foucault’s thought.
Foucault as (Virtue) Ethicist
While not usually labeled as a virtue ethicist, Foucault came 
to share with virtue ethicists the belief that the ethical phe-
nomena could be better grasped by studying how “one ought 
to form oneself as an ethical subject” (Foucault, 1984, p. 26; 
see Levy, 2004, for an extended treatment of these similari-
ties). Two aspects of Foucault’s take on ethics interest me.
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First, as with much of feminist moral theory (e.g., Tronto, 
1993), his view is integrally built upon a critique of power. 
Arguably Foucault’s central preoccupation, the formation of 
the subject in relation to evolving structures of control was 
viewed differently by him in the last part of his life (Koopman, 
2013). The earlier oppositional relation between freedom and 
power that marked “the dark Foucault” (Ortner, 2016, p. 51) 
was replaced by an association of co-dependency. Government 
(“the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups 
might be directed”—Foucault, 2000, p. 341), and self-gov-
ernment (“the government of the self by the self”—Foucault, 
2000, p. 364) became generatively tied. Therefore, his “ethi-
cal subject” is neither autonomous (as the Kantian universal 
legislator) nor dominated by ideological normative stances 
(as the Bourdieusian subject; see Pellandini-Simanyi, 2014). 
Rather, she is the provisional and unstable product of the rela-
tions between the freedom to act and the power-laden codes 
of conduct which she must consider when deciding on what 
to do and who to be. Ethics is thus the reflexive practice of 
freedom (Foucault, 1994, p. 284).
Second, Foucault proposes specific “parameters” to 
examine how distinct ethical subjects emerge in relation to 
the same codes of conduct and change over time. The first 
parameter of subjectivation is the “ethical substance; that is, 
the way the individual has to constitute this or that part of 
himself as the prime material of the moral conduct” (Foucault, 
1984, p. 26). It might regard one’s sexuality (Foucault’s 
object), political subjectivity (as this article will argue), or 
any other dimension informed by moral considerations. The 
second one is the “mode of subjectivation,” or “the way in 
which the individual establishes his relation to the rule and 
recognizes himself as obliged to put it into practice” 
(Foucault, 1984, p. 27), also defined by him as “the way in 
which people are invited or incited to recognize their moral 
obligations” (Foucault, 1994, p. 264). It cannot be mistaken 
for any objective code of conduct—in reality, it suggests the 
process of understanding a rule and justifying its application. 
That is, while not prescriptive—the word “virtue” is mostly 
absent from Foucault’s writings—his take presumes indi-
viduals’ lives to be pervasively influenced by an ensemble of 
normative experiences and reasoning. Third, there is the 
“ethical work [. . .] that one performs on oneself, not only to 
bring one’s conduct into compliance with a given rules, but 
to attempt to transform oneself into the ethical subject of 
one’s behaviour” (Foucault, 1984, p. 27). These practices, 
directed by and toward the individual (but with consequences 
for others), have also been called technologies of the self. 
And this leads to the fourth parameter: “ethical telos”, the 
ethical position a subjectivation aspires to—which is crucial, 
since “a moral action [. . .] tends to the establishing of a 
moral conduct that commits an individual [. . .] to a certain 
mode of being” (Foucault, 1984, p. 28). These parameters 
also help us to understand what constitutes such subject after 
all—goals, practices, perceptions.
Two Stories of Ethical Becoming
Following Faubion’s (2011) empirical analysis of these 
parameters and the methodological tradition interested in 
analyzing the relations between identity and culture through 
narratives of self-development (e.g., Sandelowski, 1991), I 
propose that algorithmic ethical subjectivations might be 
studied through the stories of how individuals have trans-
formed themselves on and through algorithmic social plat-
forms, as perceived and recounted by themselves.
Based on this definition, I examine the stories of how two 
non-expert end users’ ethical selves were transformed by 
their political usage of Facebook. These two individuals 
shared their stories with me in São Paulo (Brazil) in early 
2017. Their interviews are part of a larger research project on 
the emergence of novel forms of political citizenship among 
ordinary Brazilian individuals on and through Facebook dur-
ing Brazil’s current political crisis.7 I conducted semi-struc-
tured intensive interviews, asking participants about what 
they see, how they are seen, and what they do to become 
more or less visible when talking about or doing politics on 
Facebook. The stories compose an analytic exercise whereby 
I exemplify how algorithmic ethical subjectivation may be 
researched and revisit some elements of Foucault’s original 
theory to explore what they might mean in relation to an end 
user-oriented ethics of algorithms.
Unexpected Viral Episodes. The first individual is Cesar,8 a 
politically progressive Black man raised in the impoverished 
outskirts of São Paulo. In 2016, he published on his own Face-
book timeline a text criticizing the elitism of Brazilian leftists. 
Although he had a small network of Facebook friends, the post 
caught the attention of some “influencers—mostly journal-
ists,” Cesar said, and ended up having more than 17,000 reac-
tions, 6,000 shares, and 600 comments. He believes that, in 
total, around 1 million people were exposed to the text. Over-
night, he had thousands of friendship requests. “I had never 
experienced the power of the viral,” he told me. Until that day, 
he recalled having a “banal presence” on Facebook, seldom 
writing on politics. At the time, he was working as a clerk, but 
wanted to become a writer. “After that, I thought: what now?,” 
he said, adding that he figured out that the sudden visibility 
was a chance to somehow change his life.
The second individual is Sheila, a White woman also 
raised in a poor neighborhood of São Paulo. Her upbringing 
was mostly apolitical, and until some years ago the main sub-
ject of her posts was the Carnival. In the beginning of 2015, 
she posted a short video of herself. In it, Sheila, who is politi-
cally conservative, argued that Brazilian right-wingers 
should unite around one large street protest and avoid frag-
mentation. The video went viral after being unexpectedly 
shared by a journalist, what brought to Sheila waves of new 
followers. From 2013 until that moment, she had been talk-
ing about politics on Facebook “out of curiosity.” But, as 
with Cesar, she saw the event as an opportunity. In her case, 
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to try to disrupt what she calls the Brazilian “communist 
establishment,” which she said she hates.
They both told me that, if they were to seize the chances 
they envisioned, they would have to, at some level, trans-
form themselves to avoid disappearing in the cacophony of 
Facebook. Let me explain why this transformation can be 
conceived of as ethical.
Ethical Substance: Political Voices. The first parameter is the 
“ethical substance,” that is, the component of the self that is 
altered through a subjectivation. As explained below, the sto-
ries of Sheila and Cesar suggest that their conscious attempts 
to continue to be heard consisted centrally in the transforma-
tion of their political self-expression on Facebook. (None of 
them offered explanations or justifications for this, what sug-
gests that this choice was not weighted, or that they did not 
even perceive it as a choice.) Here, “self-expression” may be 
conceptually approached through the notion of “voice.” By 
this term I mean, with Couldry (2010), the capacity of “giv-
ing an account of oneself” and the obligation to value frame-
works and decisions which “themselves value voice” (pp. 
1-2). And we can term it “political” in as much as, through 
this “account,” one positions oneself in relation to a some-
how public matter in a somehow public channel. Defined as 
such, political voice is inherently ethical. For a proper politi-
cal subjectivity depends on one’s capacity of not only speak-
ing, but having her political voice heard (Honneth, 1996; 
Dayan, 2013). It is certain that visibility does not automati-
cally grant voice (more on this shortly). What matters, at this 
point, is that Cesar and Sheila understood that, to be properly 
heard, they had to be visible on Facebook. This leads to the 
second parameter of subjectivation.
Mode of Subjectivation: Speculative Personal Codes of Con-
duct. In their struggle for visibility, Cesar and Sheila told me 
that they had to consider the following question: what/who 
one ought to be/do to become more visible on Facebook? 
Their narratives indicate that this question entails three sepa-
rate problems.
Is There a Rule Defining How Visibility Is Conferred on Face-
book?. Despite having no technical training, they were dif-
ferently aware that a non-random rule defines how visibilities 
are regulated on the platform. In our talk, Cesar demonstrated 
a sophisticate and critical understanding of what he named 
“the algorithm,” “a set of rules to [supposedly] make the 
user’s experience better,” but whose real objective is “keep-
ing you connected to Facebook,” for commercial purposes. 
Sheila described a mechanism that works as a “filter”: 
“[Facebook records] what I see more often and then tries to 
filter [what I will see].” Cesar had read about algorithms in 
books and journalistic articles; Sheila had not. But they both 
told me that it was through the practical engagement with 
Facebook that they better understood how the mechanism 
works (see Bucher, 2016). Cesar told me that he ran “some 
tests,” changing aspects of his posts to assess whether these 
shifts increased their visibility. “It is just logic,” Sheila said 
when explaining how she learnt that the “filter” started to 
show her more political content after she began posting and 
interacting with political content more often.
Who or What Governs Such Rule?. Neither Cesar nor Sheila 
indicated the “algorithm” or the “filter” as governed exclu-
sively by Facebook. They perceived themselves as also hav-
ing some control over it. Cesar, for example, said, “We are 
the ones who generate its [the algorithm’s] behaviour. Some-
times you make choices—click on certain things. I have 
some control. I choose not to see some contents, and ask to 
see some people first.” Sheila was also aware of her ability to 
manually change how the “filter” works, and used it to block 
content on cruelty against animals—but not on politics. 
“About politics, I want to see everything. It does not matter 
if it pleases me or not.”
What Does This Rule Define as Obligations?. Since both 
Sheila and Cesar suggested that visibility is not managed uni-
laterally by an “algorithm” or a “filter,” but feeds on interac-
tions from end users, their perceptions coalesced around one 
general obligation: to be seen more often, one must make 
people “like”, comment on, and “share” one’s Facebook 
activity. Since the struggle for visibility entails the struggle 
for engagement metrics, the manipulation of how the “filter” 
manages their own visibility involved active attempts to steer 
other users’ responding actions. This general obligation is 
then realized through more specific duties, they told me. For 
Cesar, the most important duty involves readiness. To be vis-
ible, one is obliged to have opinions about all topics, particu-
larly political ones, given the political crisis in Brazil. A 
second duty regards optimizing the timing of activities—to 
get visibility, one must post in “peak times” and many times 
per week: “The times that you post, the subject that you speak 
about . . . It might not go viral, but changes the repercussion 
[of the post].” For Sheila, to increase one’s visibility, what she 
calls “populism” is essential. “Populism,” for her, involves 
“zoeira,” an idiomatic Brazilian expression which indicates 
the use of humor, falsehoods, and exaggerations to attack an 
opponent. “Without ‘zoeira,’ it does not go viral. [But] it’s a 
massive futility, just a gratuitous aggression.” In sum, while 
the basic tenet of Facebook’s algorithmic logic seemed to be 
intelligible to them both in quite similar ways (as reflected in 
what I called “general obligation”), the reasons of this tenet 
were opaquer, thus subject to a wider variety of interpreta-
tions (the “more specific duties”).
As such, their perceptions gained a clearer ethical mean-
ing when they became speculative personal codes of con-
duct. By this I mean that these “codes” were constituted as an 
abstract and individualized (as opposed to written and 
shared) bundle of duties, derived from concrete observations 
and information but working according to a unifying logic 
which could only be speculated (as opposed to be known).
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Ethical Work: Immoderation/Moderation of Political Voices. These 
codes guided their ethical work—but did not impose compli-
ance. Cesar initially employed “marketing techniques” to 
engage followers. The once politically quiet man trans-
formed his Facebook voice, he said. He began to post several 
times a week and express opinions about the details of the 
Brazilian political crisis. It worked: he managed to turn many 
of his posts “viral” and cemented what he came to see as a 
loyal public. But then the hectic involvement with his own 
new practices of expression and new readers prompted ethi-
cal doubts. Cesar told me,
You start to ask yourself: I am going to go viral with this post, 
but going viral for what? You learn you must [verbally] assault a 
politician to be seen, then you do that over and over again to 
remain visible. Is this ethical? I have my rules on how to write 
[and they] are not the rules of Facebook.
He sensed he no longer needed to aggressively pursue visibil-
ity, and refrained from it. “It is not really honest. I thought I 
should have a more responsible presence on the Internet.” 
This involved talking less and less controversially.
Sheila also transformed her political voice on Facebook. 
She posted almost exclusively about politics (rather than the 
Carnival), created two fan pages, and began to publish con-
servative content (including memes of her own creation) at 
least three times a day—which requires professional-like 
discipline, she said. In line with her own code of conduct, she 
constantly attacked Brazilian “lefties.” She gave me the 
example of how calling feminists “potential whores” was an 
efficient technique. “I do not really think all feminists are 
potential whores. But who cares? This is what goes viral.” At 
any rate, these aggressive practices triggered a snowballing 
effect: the more she attacked, the more she got attacked, 
which increased her willingness to keep attacking. “I became 
more and more polarized.” This is not to say that she enjoys 
the criticisms—or even “personally” wants more visibility. 
But, according to her, those are the “price” to be paid for her 
project of undermining “communism.”
Both Sheila and Cesar used techniques I would term 
immoderate. To increase their visibility, they talked more 
often and more aggressively. However, the differences 
between their trajectories point to the indeterminacy of subjec-
tivations. Despite having similar notions about Facebook’s 
algorithmic management of visibility, their individual conduct 
evolved differently. For Cesar, these immoderate practices of 
self-formation prompted critical self-reflection and led him to 
adopt an opposing set of practices, aimed at self-control—in 
consonance with his belief about what counts as an “honest” 
voice. Sheila, on the other hand, is conscious that her immod-
erate practices have radicalized her, but is unwilling to halt 
them due to the political quest she finds herself immersed in.
Ethical Telos: Two Modes of Political Voices. Sheila and Cesar 
initially seemed to share the same ethical telos of political 
recognition—they aspired to be not only visible, but recog-
nized as political subjects. However, by engaging in the 
practices incentivized by this logic, their similar initial telos 
got bifurcated. For Cesar, visibility and recognition drifted 
apart. The more he struggled for engagement metrics to 
become algorithmically visible, the more he got consciously 
uncomfortable with the ethical consequences of this strug-
gle. He came to realize that what he aspired to was not to 
simply “go viral,” but be recognized as a responsible politi-
cal voice—even if this meant limiting his reach. Sheila also 
reflected on her actions, as evidenced by her awareness of 
the questionable ethical nature of her visibility-enhancing 
strategies. But this reflection did not lead her to curb her 
voice. Instead, she got consciously radicalized. By strug-
gling for visibility, she realized she aspired to be recognized 
as an antagonistic political voice—even if this meant being 
attacked by those she antagonizes with.
Algorithmic Ethical Subjectivation: Three Features
However limited, the analyses of Cesar’s and Sheila’s stories 
allow me to trace the contours of algorithmic ethical subjec-
tivations. I understand them as the plural, contextual, and 
potentially harmful processes through which non-expert end 
users, guided by the normative meaning they assign to social 
platforms’ algorithmic decisions, intentionally engage in 
ordinary reflective practices to transform elements of their 
selves and become who they aspire to be. While congruent 
with or explicitly contemplated by Foucault’s view, plurality, 
contextuality, and potential harmfulness gain determinate 
forms when the subjectivation is algorithmic, as I propose 
next.
Plurality. From my brief analytical exercise, algorithmic ethi-
cal subjectivations emerge as triply plural. First, algorithmic 
power does not seem to automatically “produce” the same 
kinds of subjects. As exemplified by Cesar’s and Sheila’s tra-
jectories, different ethical works and telos might unfold in 
relation to the same algorithmic logic—and even change 
during the process. Second, algorithmic subjectivations may 
involve an axiological plurality. As such, they can gravitate 
not only toward privacy, diversity, fairness, and autonomy 
but also to other values such as voice. The study of algorith-
mic ethical subjectivations should thus be sensitive to all 
forms of duties, goods, and virtues, which are at stake in spe-
cific processes. Third, there is a plurality of ethical actions. 
Drawing the exact boundaries of the ethical domain is a lin-
gering difficulty (Cassaniti & Hickman, 2014). It might, but 
need not be limited to certain special moments commonly 
thought of as “ethical”—for example, the violation of rules 
and the assignment of responsibility. With Williams (1985), I 
argue that transformations of the self in response to algorith-
mic decisions will be ethical every time they are intention-
ally entangled with the question of how one should live. And 
with Das (2017), I see these actions as ethical even when 
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their authors do not name them as “ethical,” as Sheila did 
not. Such pluralities might be explained by how an algorith-
mic ethical subjectivation can only take place in a multiply 
contextualized manner.
Contextuality. Invoking “context” to discuss digital datafica-
tion is hardly new (boyd and Crawford, 2012; Seaver, 2015). 
Yet most of the approaches concern the actions presided over 
by sorters, and how policymakers and technologists can pre-
vent or ameliorate harms (e.g., Nissenbaum, 2010). The 
notion of context is differently defined here. For me, they are 
conditions, which, while not depending on end users’ algo-
rithmic ethical subjectivations to exist, make these processes 
possible.
Predefining which contexts are the “correct” ones is a 
losing game (Burke, 2002). But some appear to be neces-
sary to my discussion. The central necessary context com-
prises the decisions algorithms make on behalf of end 
users (e.g., Facebook’s news feed). From the non-expert 
end user perspective, they are a form of sociomaterial con-
text instantiated not through complexes of computational 
code and digital data, but on a deceptively simple inter-
face. It is the deliberate attempt by an individual to change 
herself in response to what she speculates as the logic 
behind these decisions that defines an ethical subjectiva-
tion as “algorithmic.” Even when she ignores the term 
“algorithm,” as Sheila did. This kind of context encom-
passes thus a direct consideration of the power laden-struc-
tures which “are proposed, suggested, imposed” to users 
(Foucault, 1994, p. 291).
Another necessary context is epistemological, which 
allows individuals to assign normative meanings to algorith-
mic decisions (and other contexts). They include, for 
instance, not only self-reflexivity and critical thinking but 
also literacies and shared narratives about algorithms. 
Consider, for instance, the personal characteristics, skills and 
information that allowed Sheila and Cesar to understand 
Facebook’s regulation of visibility in the way they did.
Finally, there are ethical contexts. By this, I mean the 
individuals’ set of moral dispositions and beliefs which must 
be in place before going through any transformation (e.g., 
Cesar’s notion of honesty). Other contexts are necessarily 
present, but not necessarily invoked in all algorithmic ethical 
subjectivations. By this I mean, for instance, “sociopolitical” 
contexts—which also point to power structures. It includes 
broad political circumstances (e.g., the Brazilian crisis), 
which framed the processes I analyzed above, but also, soci-
etal classifications, such as class, gender, and race. Cesar’s 
subjectivation, for instance, was partly motivated by his wish 
to transcend the place he was assigned in Brazil’s acutely 
classist and racist social order. There are also contexts which 
involve personal emotions and desires, which routinely and 
consciously inform individuals’ moral deliberation and 
actions. Take Sheila’s hatred against Brazil’s “communists,” 
which fueled her quest for visibility.
Therefore, while the normative meaning assigned to algo-
rithmic decisions (the said “mode of subjectivation”) is the 
lodestar of the process I have been discussing so far, it can-
not, in isolation, explain such a process. “Contextuality” 
means not only paying attention to which contexts play 
which role in which subjectivation but also to how these 
roles are shaped by the relations between contexts. If algo-
rithmically mediated communication is neither “fundamen-
tally liberating” nor “wholly exploitative” (Mansell, 2017, p. 
46), a rigorous attention to these contexts might help us 
understand under which conditions subjectivations become 
harmful, as explained next.
Potential Harmfulness. According to the moral harm para-
digm, harms are directly inflicted upon sortees by the power 
of external algorithms to invisibly analyze data and make (or 
assist in the making of) normative decisions. My proposal 
points to a different mechanism.
When individuals translate the normativity of algorithmic 
power into personalized codes of conduct, such power does 
not directly and necessarily produce harm. Rather, it might 
incentivize end users to perform harmful acts. The stories 
analyzed above indicate two modalities of these acts. The 
first one is self-inflicted. Consider Cesar’s trajectory, and 
how he initially undermined his own understanding of what 
is “ethical” to get his political voice heard. The second is 
inflicted on others by someone going through an algorithmic 
ethical subjectivation. This is exemplified by Sheila’s con-
scious attempts to increase her visibility by demeaning polit-
ical opponents’ dignity. These kinds of harms add conceptual 
and political complexity to discussions of accountability. 
Conceptually, it becomes more difficult to discern to what 
extent non-expert end users are ethically responsible for 
harms practiced by themselves, but made possible by an 
algorithmic logic they are not responsible for (Gerlitz, 2016). 
Politically, sorters can further exploit end users’ moral 
agency as a discursive pretext to shift blame (Sandvig, 2015).
The framework this article has advanced does not offer 
straightforward responses to these difficulties. But it does 
provide largely unexplored analytical avenues to recognize 
and understand the role played by algorithmic contexts in 
these types of harms. Such critique would look into which 
“models” of subjectivation are “proposed for setting up and 
developing relationships with the self” (Foucault, 1984, p. 
29) on different algorithmic social platforms. That is, how 
the sociomaterial contexts enabled by platforms, always 
vis-à-vis other contexts, incentivize and suppress certain 
subjectivations.
While I cannot properly answer here which ethical sub-
jectivation model(s) Facebook’s algorithmic regulation of 
visibility “proposes,” my empirical analysis suggests a path. 
This regulation appears to invite users to believe that having 
their political voice heard (being recognized) comes at the 
cost of a basic disposition needed for a proper coexistence 
with others (the willingness to recognize opponent’s 
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dignity). As if the proper constitution of the political self was 
detrimental to the constitution of the political other. This of 
course echoes a core concern of the moral harm paradigm. 
However, it primarily undermines not a universal value 
(diversity), but a mode of being ethical (a telos) that aspires 
for the possibility of a community. The resulting “invitation” 
to reject a communal telos might not be irresistible (e.g., 
Cesar), but is certainly alluring (e.g., Sheila). This is a stun-
ning contradiction to Facebook’s stated mission of bringing 
“the world closer together” (Zuckerberg, 2017).
Conclusion
Much of the critical literature “positions ‘the algorithm’ as 
the thing to be explained” (Gillespie, 2016, p. 53). This is 
usually the case with approaches concerned with how opaque 
algorithms produce moral harms. An alternative view has 
argued that, in fact, social platforms’ algorithms can “become 
legible, meaningful, and contested” to some of their ordinary 
end users (Gillespie, 2016, p. 69). But the ethical ramifica-
tions of this possibility have been largely ignored. This arti-
cle attempted to theorize one of them.
I have argued that the normative meaning end users 
assign to algorithmic decisions has constitutive ethical prop-
erties. It may orient how they intentionally change certain 
components of themselves through certain practices on 
themselves to achieve a certain mode of being ethical. That 
is, it may transform who they are as ethical subjects. 
Studying these algorithmic ethical subjectivations, as I have 
termed these processes, entails two movements. First, 
decentering algorithms and their controllers in favor of end 
users’ multiply contextualized realities and perceptions. 
Second, pausing consequentialist and deontological assump-
tions in favor of a critical virtue ethics—such as the 
Foucauldian thought I built on.
My approach suggests that, once the meaning produced 
by end users is taken into consideration, the idea that algo-
rithms mold users’ identity despite their control should be 
nuanced. As my examination of the stories of ethical becom-
ing suggests, the objective logic behind algorithmic deci-
sions neither imposes any precise meaning about them nor 
defines how such meaning is acted upon by an end user. That 
is, we can alter how we conduct ourselves as a deliberate 
response to algorithms’ perceived attempt to conduct us. But 
this process cannot be explained away by the built-in norma-
tive leanings of these algorithms. It does not follow that algo-
rithmic decisions do not engender harmful subjectivations, 
but that these harms are neither necessary nor necessarily 
inflicted upon users from the outside. Instead, it might be 
that by trying to comply with what we think algorithms want 
from us, users consciously act in ways that harm themselves’ 
and others’ autonomy.
It is evident that the usefulness of my proposition is lim-
ited by individuals’ awareness of platforms’ inner workings. 
Therefore, some of the most fundamental consequences 
algorithms are involved in remain best addressed by a third-
person conception of morality. Consider violations of pri-
vacy and fairness, much of which are operationalized beyond 
the very possibility of end users’ perceptions. What algorith-
mic ethical subjectivation does offer is a distinct point of 
departure to broaden what can be known about the “inherent 
humanness” (Lemov, 2016) of datafication normativity.
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Notes
1. For an ampler review, see Mittelstadt, Allo, Taddeo, Wachter, 
and Floridi (2016).
2. See Fourcade and Healy (2013).
3. There are of course exceptions (see, for example, Brunton & 
Nissembaum, 2015).
4. While not operating squarely within this paradigm, see Couldry 
and Powell (2014), Kennedy, Poell, and van Dijck (2015), and 
Beer (2009) for considerations on this ordinariness.
5. That is, digital platforms which are “social” inasmuch as on 
them individuals and organizations are able to produce/circu-
late and consume/interact with various forms of digital content 
(Ellison & boyd, 2013) and are “algorithmic” insofar as these 
acts of production/circulation and consumption/interaction 
have their “relevance” ranked by algorithms.
6. See also, for example, Vallor (2012), Bakardjieva and Gaden 
(2012), and Cammaerts (2015) for works on non-algorithmic 
subjectivations.
7. This article does not delve into this intricate crisis. For an 
introduction in English, see Anderson (2016).
8. Biographical details of the participants included in this article 
were changed to preserve anonymity.
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